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Since early 1999, global trade liberalization has moved to the wayside as regional preferential 
trade agreements have become the preferred choice in East Asia. Does this shift toward regional 
trade agreements (RTA) suggest that global trade and welfare levels will be raised?  Regional 
preferential trade arrangements, in contrast to unilateral trade liberalization, may well cause both 
‘trade creation’ and ‘trade diversion’. If an RTA raises trade and welfare among its members but 
hurts the welfare of non-members, its net effect on global trade and welfare becomes ambiguous. 
The hypothesis of ‘natural trading partners’ suggests that RTAs comprising natural trading 
partners are more likely to create trade between member countries, and less likely to divert trade 
from non-member countries, and thus leading to large improvements of economic welfare. Based 
on the existing RTAs in the world, we find that if an RTA forms between geographically 
proximate countries (measured either by distance or border), trade significantly increases 
between member countries.  At the same time, we find that geographical proximity also 
contributes to increasing trade between a member and the rest of the world. We apply our 
findings to East Asia and examine how the existing or proposed East Asian trading blocs affect 
intra-bloc and extra-bloc trade, and thereby global trade. We find the East Asian RTAs are likely 
to create more trade among members without diverting trade from non-members. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since early 1999, global trade liberalization has moved to the wayside as regional trade 
agreements have become the preferred choice in East Asia.  East Asian countries began 
to actively participate in joining or creating regional trade agreements (RTAs)１. The 
momentum toward regional trading blocs in East Asia raises many questions that are 
important not only for the economies in the region but also all their trading partners.  
Does this shift toward regional trade agreements suggest that global trade and 
welfare levels will be raised?２ Regional preferential trade arrangements, in contrast to 
unilateral trade liberalization, may cause both trade creation and trade diversion. If an 
RTA raises trade and welfare among its members but hurts the welfare of non-members, 
its net effect on global trade and welfare becomes ambiguous. If RTAs damage the 
economies of non-members, RTAs could become a stumbling block, rather than a 
building block, in Bhagwati (1993)’s term, toward global free trade.  
 In this context, a simple conceptual criterion of assessing trade creation and 
trade diversion effects of RTAs is whether the member countries are natural trading 
partners or not. The hypothesis of natural trading partners, which has been raised by a 
series of papers by Wonnacott and Lutz (1989), Summers (1991), Krugman (1993), and 
Frankel et al. (1995), suggests that RTAs constituting natural trading partners are more 
likely to create trade between member countries, and less likely to divert trade from 
non-member countries, thus leading to large improvements of economic welfare. In this 
                                                 
１ While we use the term “Regional Trade Agreement”, a more precise terminology would be 
“Preferential Trade Agreement” because it is not necessarily an agreement between regionally close 
countries. In this paper, however, we use the two terms inter-changeably, by taking RTA broadly to cover 
trade agreements among geographically apart countries,  
２ This question has been raised by, among others, Bhagwati (1993). Recently Lee, Park and Shin (2004) 
empirically investigated why regional trade agreements (RTAs) are proliferating. They find that while 
RTAs on average increase global trade by raising intra-bloc trade without damaging extra-bloc trade, it is 
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theory, geographically proximate countries are more likely to be natural partners for 
preferential trade arrangements. The key point is that geographical transportation costs 
permits proximately situated countries to have higher volumes of trade with each other 
than countries further away from each other. If an RTA reinforces trade among natural 
trading partners, trade diverting effects would become smaller. In contrast, trade 
relations between distant nations are more likely to be less efficient because member 
countries with high transportation costs, divert trade from less costly neighborhood 
countries. 
While the natural trading partners hypothesis is a critical claim in practice as 
well as in theory, there have been surprisingly few empirical studies that support this 
argument in academic literature.３ This paper tries to fill this gap and focuses on 
assessing empirically how RTAs contribute to global trade.  Specifically, we test 
whether geographical proximity contributes to maximizing net benefits of RTAs based 
on the gravity model.  
 We consider two characteristics of member countries that represent 
geographical proximity: (i) the geographical distance between members; and (ii) 
whether a land border is shared between member countries or not; evaluating if they 
affect trade diversion as well as trade creation of RTAs.  In addition, we consider one 
more characteristic of member countries that are also considered to influence 
transportation costs: (iii) whether a common language is used by members or not.  We 
find that these three country characteristics are significantly important determinants of 
RTA trade creation and diversion.  Especially, if an RTA is created between 
                                                                                                                                               
less likely that the currently proliferating RTAs will lead the world economy to globally free trade. 
３ Panagariya (1997) criticizes the ‘natural trading partners’ hypothesis on theoretical grounds. A recent 
study by Krishna (2003) empirically tests the validity of the natural trading partner theory using U.S. 
trade data and finds no supporting evidence.  
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geographically proximate countries, either measured by distance or border, trade 
significantly increases between member countries.  At the same time, we find that 
geographical proximity also contributes to an increase in trade between a member and 
the world. 
We apply our findings to East Asia and examine how the existing or proposed 
East Asian trading blocs affect intra-bloc and extra-bloc trade, and thereby global trade. 
We find that East Asian RTAs are likely to create more trade among members without 
diverting trade from non-members. Considering average geographical distance between 
members as well as the other characteristics, East Asian economies are projected to 
constitute natural trading partners.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief discussion of the 
recent trends of regional trade and preferential trade arrangements in East Asia. Section 
3 reviews the trade creation and diversion effects of RTAs, focusing on the implications 
of the natural trading partners theory. Section 4 discusses the empirical bilateral gravity 
model and relevant data. Section 5 estimates how RTAs create and divert trade, and 
examines the validity of the natural trading partners theory. Section 6 explores the 
effects of proposed East Asian RTAs on trade creation and trade diversion. Concluding 
remarks follow in Section 7. 
 
2.  Trade Integration and Regional Trading Agreements in East Asia  
 
Prompted by their export-led growth strategy and trade liberalization efforts, the 
East Asian countries continued to expand their integration into the world markets. East 
Asia’s share in total global exports increased from 11% in 1970 to 21% in 1990 and 
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then to 25% in 2001. East Asia’s share of total global imports also increased from 11% 
in 1970 to 20% in 2001 (see Table 1).  
Recently, China has been instrumental in leading the global integration of trade 
in East Asia. China’s total exports, which were merely 63 bln USD in 1990, jumped 
more than five times to 322 bln USD in 2001. Consequently, China’s share in world 
exports increased rapidly from 1.9% in 1990 to 5.2% in 2001. Over the same period, 
China’s import share also increased from 1.5% to 4.1%.  
With the increasing globalization, the integration of trade among East Asian 
economies has also been reinforced. Table 2 presents intra-regional trade as a percent 
of total trade at an aggregate level for the East Asian economies. Asian trade showed 
an escalating trend upwards. The percentage of intra-regional exports in total exports 
was about 46% on average in East Asia in 2000, increasing from 31% in 1980 and 39% 
in 1990. The corresponding percentage of intra-regional imports in total imports 
increased from 31% in 1980 to 42% in 1990 and then jumped to 54% in 2000. ASEAN 
had relatively higher intra-regional shares in exports and imports of about 53% and 
59% in 2000, respectively. Among the economies in East Asia, Japan had the lowest 
intra-regional trade (exports and imports) share of about 40% in 2000.  
The increase in intra-Asian trade is primarily attributed to the rise of bilateral 
trade of Asian economies with China. For example, China’s share in Korea’s total 
external trade has steadily increased over the 1990s, from 4.0% in 1992 to 9.4% in 
2000. Currently, China is the largest trading partner for South Korea. Trade between 
China and Japan has also continued to increase. In 2000, China’s export to Japan 
amounted to about 14.5% of Japan’s total imports, while Japan’s export to China was 
about 6.3% of Japan’s total exports. 
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On average, the share of intra-regional trade in East Asia was somewhat lower 
than the corresponding value for Euro area, which was 66% in 2000. One reason for 
relatively lower levels of regional trade in Asia is that they trade relatively more with 
the United States than European countries do. The share of trade with the United States 
of total trade was about 19% for East Asian economies on average, contrasting to about 
8% for European countries in 2000. But, East Asia’s trade with the U.S. tended to 
decline gradually over the past decade as these countries grew rapidly and traded more 
amongst each other. This trend is likely to continue as intra-industry trade among the 
East Asian economies is expected to increase.  
The 1990s witnessed a worldwide proliferation of regional or preferential trade 
agreements. The decade began with an implementation of the ambitious single 
European market and closed with the launch of the Euro currency. The NAFTA (North 
American Free Trade Agreement) was created among Canada, the U.S. and Mexico. In 
contrast, until the late 1990s, East Asian economies were involved with merely partial 
or loosely institutionalized groupings such as AFTA (ASEAN Free Trade Area) and 
APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation). In particular, the major three East Asian 
countries― China, Japan, and South Korea― tended to sidestep the tide of regionalism, 
and remain within the global trade arrangements under GATT and the WTO. But since 
early 1999, there was a clear shift away from globalism toward regionalism in East 
Asia. Numerous proposals for bilateral and plurilateral trading arrangements have 
emerged in East Asia. Table 3 summarizes existing RTAs, including countries in East 
Asia and on-going proposals for East Asian RTAs. Japan and Singapore launched an 
RTA in 2002. China and ASEAN agreed to launch an RTA in 2010. The Korea -Japan 
RTA has been under active negotiation since 1998. For the last two years, new intra-
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and inter-regional RTAs have proliferated: they include Japan-Mexico, Singapore-US, 
Singapore-EFTA, Korea-Chile, Korea-Singapore, and Thailand-Australia.  
There are several motivations behind the recent regional initiatives toward 
regional trade agreements (see Lee and Park 2005). First, global negotiations under the 
WTO and APEC lost some momentum in the end of the 1990s. The WTO’s failure to 
launch the New Round in 1999 and APEC’s failure to implement EVSL (Early 
Voluntary Sector Liberalization) in 1998, raised questions about the effectiveness of 
the global liberalization approach. The slow progress of global trade liberalization 
made East Asian economies shift their interest to regionalism. They also needed to 
dispel the fear of being left out from the world-wide proliferation of regionalism.  
Second, there has been an increased demand for regional economic cooperation 
including trade and financial cooperation in the regions. The outbreak of the East Asian 
financial crisis in 1997 called for closer economic policy cooperation among East 
Asian economies. The interdependence among the East Asian economies through 
regional trade and financial linkages continues to increase to the present day. In 
addition, recent developments in individual economies such as China's rapid economic 
growth and entry into the WTO, Japan's prolonged recession and desire to regain its 
leadership role in the region, South Korea's reform efforts toward a more liberalized 
economic system, and Singapore's active goal to become a hub of regionalism also 
contributed to East Asia’s push toward regionalism. 
Third, East Asian countries keep strong initiatives to liberalize their trade to 
other countries within and outside the region. As they continued trade liberalization 
efforts in the past decades, they are now actively participating in bilateral and 
plurilateral trade negotiations toward trade liberalization. The domestic resistance 
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against liberalization is relatively less powerful in these export-oriented economies. In 
addition, because the members of East Asian trade blocs do not have significant 
intentions to build discriminatory trading blocs, they are more open to the expansion of 
the membership. For instance, ASEAN continues to support the extension of 
membership to other countries, including the big three Asian countries— China, Japan, 
and South Korea.   
 
3.  Impacts of Regional Trade Agreements on Trade Creation and Diversion  
. 
The question of whether RTAs actually increase trade among members (or at 
least not decrease trade between members and non-members) can be conveniently 
analyzed by employing the concepts of trade creation and trade diversion effects 
introduced by Viner (1950).  These two concepts are further developed, among others, 
by Kemp and Wan (1976).  Since then there have been numerous studies analyzing the 
welfare effects of RTAs from both theoretical and empirical bases.４  
The concepts of trade creation and diversion, originally developed by Viner 
(1950) and Kemp and Wan (1976), are closely related to the efficiency gains achieved 
through RTAs.  The mere fact that bilateral trade flows increase between member 
countries does not necessarily mean that the efficiency is enhanced by the introduction 
of RTAs.  Trade creation (the increase in bilateral trade between member countries) is 
likely to occur at the expense of trade diversion (the decrease in imports from non-
member countries).  Viner (1950) pointed out that an RTA improves a nation’s 
economic efficiency only if the RTA partner is a low-cost producer of the imported 
                                                 
４ See the discussions in Baldwin and Venables (1995), Bhagwati, Greenaway and Panagariya (1998), and 
삭제됨: )
삭제됨: )
삭제됨: a
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product. This is the case even when compared with producers at home, but also with 
those in other countries outside the RTA (even without the price discrimination against 
them). Otherwise the increased imports from the partner country would not be the best 
choice, since the third country may have been a cheaper source if the price 
discrimination were not introduced by the RTA.  
While the above argument shows that the RTA does not necessarily increase the 
welfare of member countries, Kemp and Wan (1976) demonstrated that there is always a 
way to prevent this undesirable consequence if we allow the possibility of costless 
redistribution of gains between partners.  Basically, this is done by fixing the initial 
extra-bloc trade flows and letting external tariffs adjust endogenously, in which case 
neither the RTA members nor the rest of the world can lose from the RTA. 
 The most relevant literature pertaining to the arguments in this paper are studies 
examining how some characteristics of member countries determine the net gains from 
an RTA. Especially Wonnacott and Lutz (1989), Summers (1991), Krugman (1993), and 
Frankel et al. (1995) introduce the concept of “natural trading partners” by arguing that, 
to maximize the positive welfare gains from RTAs, a lower transportation cost between 
members is the most desirable characteristic.  This conclusion reasons that, since trade 
diversion occurs when discriminatory tariff liberalization leads member countries to 
import from the suppliers who are not the lowest-cost suppliers, trade diversion is likely 
to be small if the RTA partners are initially low-cost producers.５  
  While trade creation and diversion effects are theoretically elegant, in practice, 
                                                                                                                                               
Krishna (2003). 
５ Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996), and Krueger (1999), however, argue that neighbors are not 
necessarily natural trading partners. They emphasize the importance of pre-RTA bilateral trade volume 
instead of geographical proximity between trading partners. In addition, Krueger (1999) and Lawrence 
(1996) argue that natural trading partners may not generate a net trade creation effect when neighbors 
have similar endowments.. We plan, in a subsequent paper, to examine if other characteristics, in addition 
삭제됨: create
삭제됨:  
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it is extremely difficult to accurately measure their magnitude. A convention in the 
empirical analyses (adopted in this paper) is to use the gravity model to evaluate the 
trade effects of RTAs.  This approach has limitations not based on the welfare measure. 
Trade creation and diversion effects are measured by additional trade between member 
countries and between members and non-members, respectively.  However, this 
approach can be justified if welfare gains from RTAs are maintained in proportion to the 
volume of trade increases between members subtracted by the volume of trade losses 
from non-members.６   
 
4.  Data and Empirical Methodology  
 
 Most data came from Rose (2004), which covered 175 countries from 1948 to 
1999.７  The original Rose data set has a measure for RTAs, but it consists of only 
eleven RTAs.  We expanded the data set by adding more observations comprising of 
seventeen (mostly multilateral) RTAs over the same sample period based on data from 
the WTO.８  We also counted the accession of new parties to agreements that already 
exist (e.g. Portugal and Spain’s entry into the EC in 1986) as well as a new agreement 
between the existing RTA and new parties (e.g. EC-Switzerland FTA since 1972).  
The data set has features of a panel structure consisting of 234,597 annual 
observations clustered by 12,150 country pair groups from 1948 to 1999.  The number 
of observations varies per year and summary statistics for the whole data used in the 
                                                                                                                                               
to geographical proximity, also constitute the criteria of natural trading partners. 
６ Lipsey (1957) shows that this is not entirely true. See Krishna (2003) for a simple reduced-form 
measure of welfare effect from preferential tariff reduction. 
７ The data set uploaded in the web page of Rose’s is greatly appreciated. 
８ The plurilateral RTAs included are represented in Table 5. 
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estimation are presented in column (1) in Table 4.  Of all observations, 8,436 country-
pairs (about 3.6 %) belong to RTAs (trade creation) and 114,657 country pairs (about 
48.9 %) belong to the member-non-member (trade diversion) relationship.  Summary 
statistics for each case are reported in columns (2) and (3) respectively.  In Table 4, we 
observe at least three notable findings.９ First, the logarithmic mean of trade in column 
(2) is much higher than that in column (1) or that in column (3). This indicates that 
bilateral trade between RTA members is much higher than the average bilateral trade in 
the whole sample or between member and non-members.  On the other hand, the 
logarithmic mean of trade in column (3) is comparable to that in column (1), indicating 
that bilateral trade between members and non-members is not that different from the 
average volume of bilateral trade in the whole sample.  From these figures, we could 
expect that RTAs create more trade among members without diverting trade from non-
members. Since other important variables such as year, distance and the size of country 
are not appropriately controlled, this becomes a casual observation.   
Second, RTAs have been formed among relatively smaller countries, in terms of 
both economic and geographical size.  The logarithmic mean of GDP in the pairs in 
column (2) is slightly smaller than in column (1).  Taking into considerations that the 
mean year in column (2) is much higher, this implies that RTAs tend to be formed 
among economically less significant countries.  This is confirmed by the fact that the 
logarithmic mean of GDP in the pairs in column (3) is much higher than in column (2).  
In addition, the logarithmic mean of area in the pairs in column (2) is smaller than that 
in column (1) indicating that RTAs tend to be formed among geographically smaller 
                                                 
９ These findings are also noted, among others, by Lee, Park and Shin (2004), while they also include 
many other bilateral RTAs as well.  However the differences are mostly not statistically significant since 
other important variables are not appropriately controlled. 
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countries as well.  Considering that small countries tend to be more open, more active 
RTA membership among small countries is quite plausible.  Interestingly, however, the 
logarithmic mean of per capita GDP in the pairs in column (2) is much higher than that 
in either column (1) or (3) suggesting that RTAs have been formed among relatively 
wealthier countries.  
Third, RTA membership seems to be chosen after taking account of some 
specific, possibly external characteristics.  Aside from the geographical size noted 
before, the logarithmic mean of distance is shorter in column (2) than that in column (1).  
Further, member countries in column (2) are more likely to share a common land border, 
language and common colonizer.  These all suggest that there should be some 
preferable country characteristics that naturally lead to regional integration .  Countries 
that may be close to being natural trading partners may tend to form an RTA together.    
 While the above interpretations are suggestive, they are subject to serious 
limitations in that when each variable is discussed, the other variables are not 
appropriately controlled.  A more systematic approach will follow in the next section.  
In particular, we will investigate quantitatively: (i) how much trade creation and 
diversion has occurred in general; and (ii) how the characteristics of member countries 
contribute to trade creation and diversion effects (e.g. whether there is any evidence of 
natural trading partners).  By doing so, we evaluate whether RTAs in general lead the 
global economy to global free trade. 
 We set up a conventional gravity model of international trade with a number of 
extra variables.１０  The extended gravity model of international trade takes the 
following form: 
                                                 
１０ We extend Rose (2004) for the empirical specification. 
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Where i and j denote countries, t denotes time, Tradeijt denotes the average value of the 
real bilateral trade between i and j at time t, GDP is real GDP, Pop is Population, and 
Dist is the distance between i and j. Area is the land mass of the country, Border is a 
binary variable which is unity if i and j share a land border, Language is a binary 
variable which is unity if i and j have a common language, and ExComColony is a 
binary variable which is unity if i and j were ever colonies after 1945 under the same 
colonizer. ExColony is a binary variable which is unity if i ever colonized j or vice versa, 
CurColony is a binary variable which is unity if i and j are colonies at time t. CuUnion 
is a binary variable which is unity if i and j join a currency union at time t, and Year 
denotes a set of binary variables which are unity in the specific year t.  
We constructed two RTA dummy variables, one for all intra-bloc country pairs 
(creation) and the other for all member-non-member country pairs (diversion): 
RTA/Creation is a binary variable which is unity if i and j belong to the same RTA, and 
RTA/Diversion is a binary variable which is unity if i belongs to an RTA and j does not, 
or vice versa. We posited that the estimate of the coefficient of RTA/Creation measures 
the degree of trade-creation effects of the RTA members, while that of RTA/Diversion 
captures the degree of trade-diversion effects from non-members, compared to the 
normal bilateral trade flows.  
  This approach has been extensively utilized since the studies by Aitken (1973) 
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and Bergstrand (1985) on trade creation by the European trade blocs in the 1960s and 
1970s.  More recent studies by Frankel and Wei (1993) that broadened the sample to 
include more than 60 developed and developing countries tested for trade creation in the 
EU, NAFTA, ASEAN and APEC during the 1980s found strong evidence of trade 
creation for EU and APEC. While the above studies focused on trade creation from the 
estimated coefficient of RTA/Creation, later studies by Frankel et al. (1995), Frankel 
Wei (1995), and Frankel (1997) included the trade diversion dummy, RTA/Diversion. 
They also found trade creation in most RTAs and some evidence of trade diversion in 
EU and NAFTA.  
 
5.  Impacts of Member Country Characteristics on Trade Creation and Diversion 
of RTAs 
 
5.1. Overall Trade Creation and Diversion Effects 
 
Estimates of equation (1) demonstrate the impacts of RTAs in general on bilateral trade 
flows for intra- and extra-bloc memberships.  Table 5 reports two different estimates: 
column (1) presents the random effects and column (2) presents estimates for the fixed 
effects.  A major part of the variation in bilateral trade flows seems to more than 
adequately be explained by the factors appearing in the gravity model which is well 
documented in the literature.１１   The estimated coefficients of the conventional 
variables are statistically significant and the correct sign follows much the same way as 
the model predicts. To summarize briefly, the estimated coefficients for the bilateral 
                                                 
１１ See Evenett and Keller (2002) for a recent survey of the success of the gravity model. 
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distance and log of area in pair are both negative and significant.  The estimated 
coefficient for the log of the bilateral distance (-1.219, s.e.=0.025) imply that a decline 
in the log of the bilateral distance by 0.809 (its standard deviation) leads to an increase 
of bilateral trade by 168.1 %. The estimated coefficients for log of GDP in pair, log of 
per capita GDP in pair, common land border dummy, common language dummy, ex-
common colonizer dummy, ex-colony-colonizer dummy, and current colony dummy are 
significantly positive.  Thus, larger GDP and per capita GDP lead countries to greater 
trading levels.  Using estimates in column (1), a 10% increase in GDP increases trade 
by 8.7%. A 10% increase in per capita GDP raises trade by 0.2%.  A common land 
border or common language connection increases trade by about 96.4% or 46.5%, 
respectively.１２  
Our primary interest is in the impact of RTAs on intra- and extra-bloc trade. In 
column (1), the estimated coefficient on RTA/Creation is positive and statistically 
significant.  The estimate (0.515, s.e.=0.023) implies that a pair of countries that join 
an RTA experience an increase in bilateral trade by 67.4% with other variables holding 
constant.１３  The estimate on RTA/Diversion (0.085, s.e.=0.010) is also positive and 
statistically significant.  The estimate implies that the RTA members’ trade with the 
non-members is estimated to rise by 8.9% on average.  Hence, RTAs do not divert 
                                                 
１２ For example, since e0.675=1.964, an increase from 0 (no common border) to 1 (common border) in the 
common border dummy variable raises bilateral trade by 96.4%. 
１３ Note that we treat RTAs as exogenous. However, it is plausible that RTA members trade more even 
before they form RTAs. If we do not control all the important factors explaining the bilateral flows of 
trade, the RTAs dummy could capture the uncontrolled factors, not the effects of RTAs. This problem can 
be avoided by employing fixed effects estimation that basically compares the bilateral trade flows before 
and after RTAs are formed for the same country pairs. The fixed-effects estimation results in column (2) 
of Table 2 are slightly lower, if any, and hence this problem is not likely to be too serious. Another 
problem is that countries may have joined RTAs when they expect to increase trade. Then, the large effect 
of RTAs may reflect reverse causality. This endogeneity issue can in principle be handled with 
instruments. A recent study by Baier and Bergstrand (2004) show that the instrumental variables 
estimation generates much larger effects of RTAs on trade flows than the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
results. Hence, the positive effects of RTAs on trade in OLS estimation do not seem to reflect the reverse 
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trade from the rest of the world if they do not belong to the bloc.  
Column (2) of Table 5 presents the fixed effect within estimates.  By capturing 
the influences from omitted country-specific factors, we are able to produce more 
consistent estimates when we add country pair dummy variables.１４ This estimate 
from time-series variation is useful in answering the question of “What would happen to 
a country’s intra- and extra-bloc trade after joining an RTA?”.  One drawback to this 
fixed-effect approach is, since the fixed effect estimator exploits only the variation over 
time, we cannot obtain the estimates for time-invariant factors such as distance, area, 
land border, and ex-colonial relationship. 
The fixed-effects estimate on Trade/Creation (0.416, s.e.=0.024) shows that 
joining an RTA raises intra-bloc trade by 51.6%, which is slightly smaller than that from 
the random effects estimate.  The estimated coefficient on Trade/Diversion (0.063, 
s.e.=0.010) is also slightly smaller than that for the random effects, but is statistically 
significant.  Overall, however, the fixed effects estimate is very consistent with the 
random effects estimate.  Both estimates show that after a joining an RTA, its intra-
bloc trade increases considerably, without having any negative impact on its extra-bloc 
trade. This suggests that RTAs can lead to an increase in global trade. Nevertheless, the 
following sections will further examine this issue.    
 While there is no doubt that the elimination of tariffs for member countries 
leads to trade creation, the finding of increased trade with non-member countries also 
warrants some explanations. In fact, there are quite a few empirical studies, focusing on 
                                                                                                                                               
causality that runs from trade to the choice of joining an RTA.  
１４ For example, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) show that the typical gravity model does not 
incorporate the ‘relative distance effect’, i.e., the likelihood that a country pair that is located more 
distantly from the world market will trade more than otherwise.  As shown by Feenstra (2002), the 
fixed-effect estimation can provide consistent-estimates by controlling for the unobserved (time-
invariant) relative distance term. 
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the cases of individual RTAs, suggesting that RTAs expand intra-bloc trade, but contract 
trade with non-member countries. Frankel and Wei (1998) show that the European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA) has a significant trade-diversion effect. In theory, if imports 
from RTA members substitute imports from non-members, trade diversion can be 
positive. In addition to this static effect, there are dynamic effects too. If increased trade 
between member countries expands markets, creates more investment, and results in 
income growth, RTAs can provide non-members with increased opportunities to exploit 
the larger market, thereby reducing the problem of diverting trade.  This growth effect 
may lead RTAs to increase trade with non-member countries.  Lawrence (1996) 
indicates that the growth effects of RTAs can offset the initial trade diversion effect 
because import demands from non-members can be stimulated by growth or economies 
of scale.  Wonnacott and Lutz (1989) and Wonnacott (1996) also highlight the 
importance of economies of scale that increase the efficiency of unproductive members 
by lowering their production costs enough to reduce the possibility of trade diversion.  
In addition, Wonnacott (1996) argues that trade diversion may force import-competing 
industries in member country to reduce their trade barriers against non-members 
because of increased competition from RTAs. It is also likely that trade liberalization 
with members can help to reduce domestic distortions in the overall economy. 
 
5.2.  Are There Natural Trading Partners? 
 
Wonnacott and Lutz (1989), Summers (1991), Krugman (1993) and Frankel et al. 
(1995) argue that RTAs are more likely to improve welfare levels if member countries 
are considered as natural trading partners. In order to investigate this possibility, we test 
삭제됨: are balance 
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if there are some desirable characteristics that lead to more trade creation while 
reducing trade diversion.１５.    
As surveyed in section 3, one important factor that is often considered in 
association with natural trading partners is low transaction costs.  Based on this idea 
we adopted two criteria to select natural trading partners: geographical distance and 
language.  That is, we assume that transaction costs will be lower if two countries are 
situated close together or if two countries share a common language.  According to our 
classification, natural trading partners are defined as closely located countries or those 
using a common language (e.g. Canada and the U.S.). As an indication of geographical 
proximity, we use either a common land border or geometric distance. Following the 
convention in the literature, geographical distance is measured between capitals. One 
important advantage in considering these characteristics is that they are regarded as 
external to trade, since it is impossible to relocate countries and extremely unlikely for a 
language to change because a country trades more with its partner country.１６  
  In Table 6, we report statistics on three characteristics of member countries for 
RTAs in the sample. If the accession of new parties is made, we report the same 
statistics for the year of the most recent accession. In the sample, there are five RTAs 
to which the accession of new parties is made: CARICOM, CEFTA, EC, EFTA and 
MERCOSUR. There are three important findings from Table 6.  First, while there are 
substantial differences in the average distance across RTAs, the average distance 
between pairs of member countries for every RTA is smaller than the average distance 
                                                 
１５ The similar issue is recently examined by Lee, Park and Shin (2004). We extend their analyses in the 
following way. While Lee, Park and Shin (2004) focuses on characteristics of RTA member countries that 
enhance trade creation only, this paper considers characteristics of RTA member countries that may affect 
on trade diversion as well.  
１６ While a common land border and a common language are quite exogenous, the distance measure is 
relatively less so because the location of the capital can be endogenously determined after taking into 
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between pairs of the whole sample in Table 4. The average distance for 6 out of 17 
RTAs belongs to the lowest 5 % tail of the distance of the whole sample.  Also the 
average of the land border dummy is , high, in most cases. For 7 RTAs, more than half 
of the country pairs share a common land border. In sum, these results confirm that 
RTAs tend to be formed by geographically proximate countries.  
 Second, the average of the common language dummy is also high. For 7 out of 
17 RTAs, more than half of the country pairs in the same RTA use a common language. 
Especially, five RTAs - CACM, CAN, CARICOM, CER and GCC - comprise only the 
countries using a common language. This reinforces the finding that RTAs are more 
likely formed by countries with a common language. 
 In order to investigate how the three characteristics of member countries affect 
trade creation and diversion, two new variables are introduced, corresponding to each 
characteristic.  For example, we have defined two interaction terms between the intra- 
and extra-bloc RTA dummies and distance: / ijRTA CreatDist  and / ijRTA DiversDist . 
We construct / ijRTA CreatDist by interacting the bilateral distance between country (i, 
j) with the intra-bloc dummy, (Trade/Creation), to examine the effect of the distance 
between member countries on trade creation.  However, caution is warranted to define 
/ ijRTA DiversDist . Since / ijRTA DiversDist  represents the effect of member country 
characteristics on trade diversion, it is nonzero only if either i or j or both are members 
of some other RTA, but not the same.  For example, suppose that country i belongs to 
an RTA. We need to examine how the distance of member countries affect trade 
diversion of country i from a non-member country. Hence, we calculate the average 
                                                                                                                                               
consideration of the location of major trading partners.   
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distance between country i and other member countries and use it to interact with the 
extra-bloc dummy, RTA/Diversion.  If country i belongs to multiple RTAs, we 
calculate the average distance with member countries for all RTAs that country i 
belongs to.１７ In this way, we define six interaction terms between the intra- and 
extra-bloc RTA dummies and the three 
characteristics: / ijRTA CreatDist , / ijRTA DiversDist , / ijRTA CreatBorder , 
/ ijRTA DiversBorder , / ijRTA CreatLang , / ijRTA DiversLang . 
 Adding the eight new variables, we modify the basic equation (1) as follows: 
 
1 2
3 4 5
6 7 8
ln( ) Other control variables / /
/ / /
/ / /
ijt ijt ijt
ijt ijt ijt
ijt ijt ijt ijt
Trade RTA Creation RTA InDist
RTA CreatBorder RTA CreatLang RTA Diversion
RTA DiversDist RTA DiversBorder RTA DiversLang
γ γ
γ γ γ
γ γ γ ε
= + +
+ + +
+ + + +
(2) 
윗식에서 첫 줄에 / ijRTA CreatDist 로 바꾸어 주십시요. 
In this setting, total additional trade created by forming RTAs between bordering 
members is estimated by summing up the coefficients of the two dummy variables, 
/RTA Creation  and /RTA CreatBorder . This takes into calculation the coefficient of 
/RTA Creation  which represents trade creation of RTAs for members and that of 
/RTA CreatBorder  which represents additional trade creation for bordering members 
of the RTA.  On the other hand, a different degree of trade diversion from a non-
member country, due to the average number of bordering countries in the RTA, is 
estimated by summing up the coefficients of two dummy variables, /RTA Diversion  
and /RTA DiversBorder . This trade scenario takes into calculation the coefficient of 
                                                 
１７ If both country i and j belong to different RTAs, we also calculate the average distance for each 
country with its member partners respectively and use the average of the two averages. 
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/RTA Diversion  which represents trade diversion from an excluded country and 
/RTA DiversBorder  which represents additional trade diversion due to the average 
number of bordering countries in the RTA.  
Before we consider the possibility that the three characteristics do indeed 
affect trade diversion, we focus on how they affect trade creation. In Table 7, the results 
are reported when we include the three interaction terms with the intra-bloc dummy 
variable. Since the estimation results with random effects are very similar to those with 
fixed effects, we have just reported the estimation results with fixed effects.  In 
columns (1), (2) and (3), an interaction term for each characteristic is added separately.  
Then all three interaction terms are included together in column (4). The first three 
estimated coefficients for the time-varying control variables (as well as the estimated 
coefficient of RTA/Diversion), are remarkably similar across columns and with those 
estimated in Table 7. This justifies the focus on the coefficients of RTA/Creation related 
variables only.  
In column (1), unlike the coefficients of the time-varying control variables, the 
estimated coefficient of /RTA Creation  (2.678, s.e.=0.243) is markedly changed. In 
contrast, the estimated coefficient of /RTA CreatDist  (-0.327, s.e.=0.035) is highly 
significant and negative which implies that an increase in log of bilateral distance by 
0.797 (its standard deviation) leads to a 29.8% decline in bilateral trade creation for the 
intra-membership. For example, if the distance between member countries is 6.760 (the 
average distance of member countries in Table 4, trade creation is 0.467 
( 2.678 0.327 6.760= − ∗ ), which is very close to the estimate of trade creation for the 
RTA in general in Table 5. When we use the border dummy as an alternative measure of 
proximity, the interaction term is also positive and very significant. If we just take the 
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figures in column (2), they suggest that trade creation between bordering RTA members 
(192.0%) is more than three times as large as that between non-bordering members 
(55.4%).  
In column (3), we also find that a common language plays a role in determining 
the impact of RTAs on trade creation.  The estimated coefficient for /RTA Creation  
is again significantly lower than the estimate in Table 5, and the coefficient of 
/RTA CreatLang  is positive and highly significant.  The estimate is, however, smaller 
than the estimate for the trade creation made by bordering members. This implies that 
while a common language also contributes to increasing the impact of trade creation of 
RTAs, it does not increase as much as sharing a common land border. 
Overall, our results consistently show that the impact of RTAs can be greater 
for countries that have considerably lower transaction costs. In column (4), when we use 
the three interaction terms together as regressors, we also reach the same conclusion.  
All the coefficients are statistically significant and close to those estimated separately. 
So far we have considered the possibility of different characteristics of member 
countries to impact trade creation of RTAs. Now we examine the possibility of the same 
characteristics of member countries to impact trade diversion from the rest of the world. 
According to the logic of natural trading partners who rely heavily on low transaction 
costs, these lower costs between member countries also helps reduce trade diversion 
from non-member countries.  In an extreme case, for example, if the transaction costs 
with non-member countries are prohibitively high, trade diversion is nil because there is 
no trade to divert from the beginning.  
 Table 8 reports the regression results of specification (2) to investigate the 
impact of the three characteristics on trade diversion and trade creation. As in Table 7, 
삭제됨: are 
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we report the regression results with one pair of interaction terms separately in each 
column, then the regression result with all the terms together in the last column. The 
conclusions drew on the impacts of trade creation are remarkably preserved; all the 
evidence suggests that lower transaction costs contribute to large trade creation effects.  
 Now we turn to trade diversion effects. In column (1), when we include a pair 
of interaction terms related to distance, the estimated coefficient of /RTA DiversDist  
is negative and highly significant, which indicates that the closer the member countries, 
the smaller the trade diversion from the rest of the world. For example, for the member 
countries located apart by the average distance of the whole RTA sample, trade 
diversion amounts to 0.062 (= 0.258-0.029*6.760). This is very close to the estimate of 
trade diversion for the RTA in general in Table 5. In column (2), when we put the pair of 
interaction terms related to the land border dummy, we find that if member countries 
border each other, trade diversion is diminished, which reinforces the finding for 
distance. In sum, our results strongly indicate that geographical proximity contributes to 
decreased trade diversion as well as increased trade creation.  
 In column (3), when we include the pair of interaction terms related to the 
common language dummy, the estimated coefficient of /RTA DiversLang  is negative 
and highly significant, which indicates that a common language between member 
countries actually contributes to raising trade diversion. This contrasted to the finding 
that common language increases trade creation in Table 7. This discrepancy is puzzling 
and may reflect the errors inherent in the measurement of language proximity between 
member countries.  Finally in column (4), when we include all the three interaction 
terms, we find that one interaction term, /RTA DiversDist , becomes statistically 
insignificant, but the other two interaction terms are significant and consistent with the 
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individually estimated results..   
 
6.  Impacts of East Asian RTAs 
 
This section assesses how much the existing or proposed East Asian RTAs will 
give rise to trade creation and trade diversion effects. We seek for an answer to this 
question by comparing the characteristics of the East Asian RTAs to those of the other 
existing RTAs. The empirical results in the previous section show that the three 
characteristics of RTA members (geographical distance, common borders, common 
language and area) have significant impacts on trade creation and trade diversion. We 
find an RTA among natural trading partners that are located more geographically 
closely sharing a land border or larger in area size, tends to create more trade but less 
trade diversion.  
Table 9 summarizes the three characteristics of member countries for an 
existing East Asian RTAs and AFTA, as well as various proposed RTAs such as China-
Korea, Japan-Korea, China-Japan-Korea, China-AFTA, and AFTA plus 3 (China, Japan 
and South Korea). The average distance between member pairs is smallest for the 
Japan-Korea RTA (6.374), which is lower than the average distance of member pairs in 
all existing RTAs (6.760). With the exception of the Japan-Korea bloc, the average 
distance between East Asian RTAs is slightly higher than the RTA average in general. 
The members of the AFTA plus 3 have the highest average distance (7.182). Column 
(4) in Table 9 presents the estimates of trade creation between members of East Asian 
RTAs, which are constructed by combining the estimated coefficient on 
/RTA Creation  of the gravity equation in column (1) of Table 8 with the product of 
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the estimated coefficient on /RTA CreatDist  and the average distance of individual 
RTAs. The estimated trade creation effects range from 0.597 for a Japan-Korea RTA to 
0.334 for the AFTA plus 3 RTA in terms of log of bilateral trade.  
The estimates of trade diversion (considering distance characteristic only) are 
presented in column (6) of Table 9. The figures are constructed based on the estimated 
coefficients on /RTA Diversion  and /RTA DiversDist  of the gravity equation in 
column 1 of Table 8 and the average distance of individual RTAs. We found all East 
Asian RTAs are located within the range of the average geographical distance which 
does not divert trade from non-members. The estimated (negative) trade diversion 
effects range from 0.073 for the Japan-Korea RTA to 0.050 for the AFTA plus 3 RTA in 
terms of log of bilateral trade.  
Hence, considering average geographical distances between members, all East 
Asian RTA members are located close enough to create not only trade among member 
countries, but also trade between members and non-members.  
In terms of the border characteristic, there are only a few East Asian countries 
sharing a land border. In this regard, the trading costs among East Asian countries are 
higher on average than other RTA members, which provides a relatively unfavorable 
condition for creating trade among members as well as with non-members.  
The combined impacts from the three characteristics together on trade creation 
and trade diversion for members of East Asian RTAs are summarized in columns (5) 
and (7) of Table 9. The figures are constructed by combining the average characteristics 
of East Asian RTA members with the estimated coefficients in column (4) of Table 8. 
The result shows that East Asian trading blocs tend to create trade between members 
without diverting trade from non-members. According to the estimates, the AFTA incurs 
삭제됨: By contrast, the average 
geographical size of member 
countries is relatively larger for 
East Asian RTAs than for all 
existing RTAs, which helps 
contribute to net trade-creation. 
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the most trade creation effect (0.509) with a (negative) trade diversion effect (0.164). 
On the other hand, a China-Japan-Korea RTA would generate trade creation by 0.342 
and (negative) trade diversion by 0.078. .Note that the AFTA plus 3 RTA would be most 
beneficial among the East Asian blocs, because it involves the largest number of 
members among the proposed East Asian RTAs and then would increase trade between 
members (0.405) as well as between a member and a nonmember (0.123).  Our 
estimates show that all the East Asian trade blocs incur larger benefits to non-members 
than other existing RTAs. Considering the three characteristics together, the RTA in 
general is estimated to have a (negative) trade diversion effect of 0.031 on average.   
 
7.  Concluding Remarks  
 
Building on the natural trading partners theory, we have shown that the country 
characteristics of RTA members (e.g. geographical distance, land borders, and common 
language), have significant impacts on trade creation and trade diversion. Preferential 
regional trade agreements involving natural trading partners located in close proximity 
and sharing a land border tend to create more trade while diverting less trade. We found 
that East Asian economic characteristics meet the criteria for natural trading partners, 
increasing trade not only between members, but also between members and non-
members.  
 Our assessments are drawn entirely based on member characteristics of RTAs 
that are confined specifically to East Asian countries. The current regional efforts 
toward regionalism in the area are intended toward building non-discriminatory blocs, 
which may eventually lead to an integrated world economy. However, a number of 
삭제됨: both the most 
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existing and suggested RTAs involving East Asian countries, include inter-regional ones 
grouping with significantly distant nations. RTAs consisting of unnatural trading 
partners may not fully create trade between members and divert substantial trade away 
from the region. In addition, we observed many countries becoming involved in 
multiple RTAs, which can increase the costs associated with the use of restrictive rules 
of origin. Recently Lee, Park and Shin (2004) find that the net trade creation effects of 
RTAs can be substantially lower for countries participating in multiple RTAs. Unless 
these undesirable prospects of RTAs are properly dealt with, proliferating regional 
trading blocs in East Asia may not generate the full effects of net trade creation.  
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Table 1: Trade Share of East Asia in the World  
(unit: %) 
 Exports Imports 
 1970 1980 1990 2000 2001 1970 1980 1990 2000 2001 
World 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
East Asia 11.0 13.9 20.9 25.9 25.0 11.1 14.0 18.7 22.1 19.6 
Japan 6.9 7.1 8.5 7.5 6.6 6.4 7.4 6.7 5.7 5.5 
Korea 0.3 1.1 2.0 2.7 2.5 0.7 1.1 2.1 2.4 2.2 
Other 
NIES 
1.5 2.1 6.0 7.7 6.7 1.8 2.4 5.6 7.4 6.5 
ASEAN 1.8 2.6 2.6 4.1 4.1 1.7 2.0 2.8 3.1 3.2 
China 0.5 1.0 1.9 3.9 5.2 0.5 1.0 1.5 3.4 4.1 
U.S.A. 15.4 12.0 11.6 12.1 11.7 13.5 13.4 14.7 18.7 17.9 
EU 45.8 41.0 44.0 35.8 36.5 46.7 44.0 43.8 34.6 34.6 
Others 27.8 33.1 23.5 26.1 26.7 28.7 28.6 22.8 24.6 26.0 
Source: International Monetary Fund. Direction of Trade Statistics. 
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Table 2: Direction of Trade in East Asian Economies  
                                                        (unit: %) 
Export 
by  
Year East 
Asia 
Japan NIEs ASEAN China USA EU 
East Asia 1980 31.2 10.2 12.4 6.1 2.5 22.6 14.7 
 1990 39.2 8.6 19.4 7.1 4.1 26.2 17.5 
 1995 46.7 8.5 21.1 9.6 7.4 22.4 13.8 
 2000 46.3 8.7 21.2 8.3 8.1 23.9 14.9 
Japan 1980 21.8 - 10.8 7.0 3.9 24.5 15.2 
 1990 29.8 - 19.9 7.7 2.1 31.7 20.4 
 1995 42.1 - 25.1 12.1 5.0 27.5 14.8 
 2000 40.4 - 24.5 9.5 6.3 30.1 16.4 
Korea 1980 29.8 17.4 7.5 4.8 0.1 26.3 14.5 
 1990 35.9 19.4 10.5 5.0 0.9 29.8 15.4 
 1995 45.8 13.6 17.0 7.9 7.3 19.3 13.0 
 2000 43.9 11.9 14.2 7.2 10.7 21.8 13.6 
Other NIEs 1980 29.5 7.9 10.3 8.7 2.5 26.7 14.5 
 1990 40.4 8.7 11.8 9.3 10.5 26.1 17.1 
 1995 46.7 9.5 15.8 11.7 13.3 20.8 13.4 
 2000 48.1 8.9 15.4 10.6 14.2 21.8 13.7 
ASEAN 1980 54.0 34.5 15.5 3.2 0.8 18.7 13.9 
 1990 53.1 24.3 22.5 4.2 2.1 19.3 16.6 
 1995 50.0 17.4 24.4 5.3 2.8 19.6 13.7 
 2000 53.5 16.3 26.5 7.1 3.5 20.8 15.1 
China 1980 52.8 22.2 26.3 4.3 - 5.4 13.7 
 1990 64.8 14.7 47.2 2.9 - 8.5 10.0 
 1995 55.9 19.1 33.1 3.7 - 16.6 12.1 
 2000 47.2 16.7 26.7 3.7 - 20.9 15.3 
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Table 2: Continued. 
                                                       (unit: %) 
Import 
by 
Year East 
Asia 
Japan NIEs ASEAN China USA EU 
East Asia 1980 30.7 12.1 4.9 10.0 3.6 16.4 9.6 
 1990 42.2 14.1 13.4 7.6 7.1 18.1 14.3 
 1995 49.9 16.5 14.7 8.6 10.1 16.7 14.4 
 2000 51.0 14.0 14.4 10.6 12.0 14.6 11.2 
Japan 1980 20.7 - 3.6 14.0 3.1 17.4 6.5 
 1990 26.5 - 11.0 10.4 5.1 22.5 16.1 
 1995 34.4 - 12.3 11.4 10.7 22.6 13.8 
 2000 39.2 - 11.9 12.8 14.5 19.1 12.3 
Korea 1980 34.7 26.3 2.6 5.9 0.0 21.9 8.6 
 1990 39.7 26.6 4.2 5.6 3.2 24.3 13.0 
 1995 39.2 24.1 4.1 5.5 5.5 22.5 13.5 
 2000 42.3 19.8 6.0 8.5 8.0 18.2 9.8 
Other NIEs 1980 43.8 21.8 5.7 8.6 7.7 11.6 12.0 
 1990 58.2 21.0 12.9 8.0 16.4 14.7 12.6 
 1995 56.9 21.2 14.3 9.9 15.2 15.2 12.4 
 2000 58.4 18.4 13.5 12.1 17.3 13.8 9.8 
ASEAN 1980 42.0 24.2 11.0 4.0 2.8 16.1 14.9 
 1990 50.8 25.7 18.7 3.9 2.6 13.9 16.5 
 1995 53.0 26.5 17.8 6.0 2.7 14.1 14.8 
 2000 59.1 21.3 25.2 8.8 3.8 14.2 10.9 
China 1980 32.8 26.5 3.9 2.4 - 19.6 15.8 
 1990 47.4 14.2 29.1 4.0 - 12.2 12.2 
 1995 54.5 21.9 28.1 4.5 - 12.2 23.3 
 2000 53.6 18.4 28.1 7.1 - 9.9 13.7 
Source: International Monetary Fund. Direction of Trade Statistics. 
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 Table 3: Major RTAs including Countries in East Asia (June 2005) 
 
PTAs established (year of signing the agreement, year into force) 
AFTA(ASEAN Free Trade Area, 1992, 1993) Chile-Korea(2003, 2004) 
SAPTA(SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement, 1993, 1995) China-Macao SAR(2003, 2004) 
PICTA(Pacific Island Countries Trade Arrangement, 2001, 2001)3 China-Hong Kong SAR(2003, 2004) 
TPSEPA(Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement, 2005, 2006) China-Thailand(2004, 2004) 
Australia-New Zealand (1983, 1983) India-Thailand(2004, 2004) 
India-Sri Lanka (1998, 2000) Australia-Thailand(2004, 2004) 
New Zealand-Singapore (2000, 2001) Australia-United States(2004, 2005) 
Japan-Singapore(2002, 2002) Japan-Mexico(2004, 2005) 
Australia-Singapore(2003, 2003) New Zealand-Thailand(2005, 2005) 
Singapore-United States(2003, 2004) Pakistan-Sri Lanka(2005, 2005) 
PTAs under negotiation (framework agreement has been signed) 
ACCEC(ASEAN-China Comprehensive Economic Cooperation) Indonesia-Japan 
AFTA-CER CEP(AFTA-CER Closer Economic Partnership) Japan-Korea 
AICEP(ASEAN-India Comprehensive Economic Partnership) Japan-Malaysia 
AJCEC(ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Cooperation) Japan Philippine 
AKCCP(ASEAN-Korea Comprehensive Cooperation Partnership) Japan-Thailand 
BIMSTEC(Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand,  
Bhutan, Nepal Economic Cooperation) 
Korea-Mexico 
SAFTA(South Asian Free Trade Area) Korea-Singapore 
Australia-China Malaysia-Pakistan 
Australia-Japan Malaysia-New Zealand 
Australia-Malaysia Mexico-Singapore 
Canada-Singapore Panama-Singapore 
China-India Peru-Thailand 
China-New Zealand Peru-Singapore 
Hong Kong SAR-New Zealand Singapore-Sri Lanka 
India-Singapore Thailand-United States 
PTAs under discussion (framework agreement has not been signed) 
ASEAN+3(ASEAN-China-Japan-Korea) Korea-Malaysia 
ASEAN-United States EAI(Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative) Korea-New Zealand 
Australia-Chile Korea-United States 
Canada-Korea Mexico-New Zealand 
Chile-Japan New Zealand-United Stated 
India-Malaysia Philippine-United States 
 
Note: ASEAN - Association of South East Asian Nations; SAARC-South Asian Associations for Regional 
Cooperation, CER - Closer Economic Relations between Australia and New Zealand 
Sources: Feridhanusetyawan (2005) and WTO web site (www.wto.org).
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Table 4: Summary Statistics (1948-1999) 
 
 (1) All  
(N=234,597) 
(2) RTA/Creation  
(N=8,436) 
(3) RTA/Diversion 
(N=114,657) 
 Mean Std. 
Dev 
Mean Std. 
Dev 
Mean Std. Dev 
Year 1981.0 12.472 1990.1 8.219 1986.8 9.954 
Log of trade 10.062 3.336 12.540 3.293 10.040 3.553 
Log of distance 8.165 0.809 6.760 0.797 8.255 0.730 
Log of GDP in 
pairs 
47.881 2.676 47.864 4.114 48.105 2.670 
Log of per capita 
GDP in pairs 
16.034 1.503 17.260 1.600 16.517 1.360 
Log of area in pairs 24.206  3.280 22.102  3.843 23.599   3.260 
Common land 
border dummy 
0.031   0.172 0.113   0.316 0.012    0.107 
Common language 
dummy 
0.223   0.416 0.328   0.470 0.187    0.390 
Ex-common 
colonizer dummy 
0.100   0.300 0.204   0.403 0.069    0.254 
Ex-colony-
colonizer dummy 
0.021   0.142 0.031   0.173 0.026    0.159 
Current colony 
dummy 
0.002   0.044 0    0 0.001    0.036 
Currency union  0.014 0.118 0.039 0.193 0.001 0.032 
Note: The summary statistics are based on the bilateral variables for the whole sample (All), the members 
sample (RTAs/Creation), and the member-non-member sample (RTAs/Diversion). See the text for an 
explanation of variables.  
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Table 5: Effects of RTAs on Trade Flows 
 
 (1) 
Random Effects 
(2) 
Fixed Effects 
Distance -1.219** 
(0.025) 
-- 
GDP in pair 0.874** 
(0.009) 
0.404** 
(0.018) 
Per Capita GDP in pair 0.023** 
(0.010) 
0.270** 
(0.017) 
Area in pair -0.078** 
(0.008) 
-- 
Common land border 0.675** 
(0.132) 
-- 
Common language  0.382** 
(0.052) 
-- 
Ex-common colonizer  0.111 
(0.065) 
-- 
Ex-colony-colonizer  2.310** 
(0.171) 
-- 
Current colony  0.237** 
(0.087) 
0.306* 
(0.087) 
Currency union  0.608** 
(0.049) 
0.644** 
(0.050) 
RTA/Creation 0.515** 
(0.023) 
0.416** 
(0.024) 
RTA/Diversion 0.085** 
(0.010) 
0.063** 
(0.010) 
R-squared 0.60 0.51 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of real bilateral trade.  All the explanatory variables except the 
dummy variables are taken logarithms.  RTA/Creation indicates a binary variable which is unity if i and j 
belong to the same RTA. RTA/Diversion indicates a binary variable which is unity if i belongs to an RTA 
and j does not belong to the same RTA or vice versa. The panel data estimation techniques were applied to 
234,597 country pairs in total over the period from 1948 to 1999. The summary statistics for all variables 
are shown in Table 1.  Robust standard errors of the estimated coefficients are reported in parentheses.  
Intercept and year dummy variables are included (not reported). ** and * indicate that the estimated 
coefficients are statistically significant at 1 % and 5 %, respectively.  
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Table 6: Characteristics of RTAs 
 
(1) 
RTAs 
(2) 
Formation/ 
Most Recent 
Accession 
Year 
(3) 
Number of 
Countries
(4) 
Average 
Distance
(5) 
Border 
(6) 
Common 
Language
AFTA 1992 10 6.816 
(0.653) 
0.264 
(0.448) 
0.088 
(0.288) 
BAFTA 1994 3 4.907 
(0.515) 
0.667 
(0.577) 
0.000 
 
CACM  1961 5 5.613 
(0.450) 
0.500 
(0.527) 
1.000 
(0) 
CAN  1988 6 6.876 
(0.454) 
0.500 
(0.527) 
1.000 
(0) 
CARICOM 1973 10 6.303 
(0.972) 
0.000 
(0) 
1.000 
(0) 
 1997 14 6.424 
(0.920) 
0.011 
(0.107) 
0.852 
(0.357) 
CER 1983 2 7.827 
(.) 
0.000 
(.) 
1.000 
(.) 
CEFTA 1993 4 5.414 
(0.371) 
0.667 
(0.516) 
0.000 
(0) 
 1999 7 5.801 
(0.444) 
0.333 
(0.483) 
0.000 
(0) 
CIS 1994 11 7.038 
(0.724) 
0.264 
(0.445) 
0.000 
(0) 
EAEC 1997 5 7.150 
(0.765) 
0.400 
(0.516) 
0.000 
(0) 
EC 1958 6 5.781 
(0.637) 
0.600 
(0.507) 
0.200 
(0.414) 
 1998 41 6.884 
(0.640) 
0.072 
(0.259) 
0.067 
(0.251) 
EFTA 1960 2 6.816 
(0.653) 
0.264 
(0.448) 
0.088 
(0.288) 
 1999 17 6.764 
(0.743) 
0.095 
(0.295) 
0.019 
(0.137) 
GCC 
 
1981 6 5.925 
(0.673) 
0.333 
(0.488) 
1.000 
(0) 
MERCOSUR 1991 4 6.848 
(0.501) 
0.833 
(0.408) 
0.500 
(0.547) 
 1997 6 6.840 
(0.411) 
0.667 
(0.488) 
0.667 
(0.488) 
NAFTA 
 
1994 3 7.387 
(0.439) 
0.667 
(0.577) 
0.333 
(0.578) 
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PATCRA 
 
1977 2 7.448 
(.) 
0.000 
(.) 
0.000 
(.) 
SAPTA 
  
1995 7 6.878 
(0.527) 
0.235 
(0.437) 
0.176 
(0.393) 
SPARTECA 1981 8 7.455 
(0.489) 
0.000 
(0) 
0.346 
(0.485) 
Note: The full name of the RTAs is as follows: the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), Baltic Free Trade 
Area (BAFTA), Central American Common Market (CACM), Andean Community (CAN), Caribbean 
Community and Common Market (CARICOM), Central European FTA (CEFTA), Closer Economic 
Relations Trade Agreement between Australia and New Zealand (CER), Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS), Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC), European Communities/European Union (EC/EU), 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA), Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Southern Common Market 
(MERCOSUR), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Papua New Guinea - Australia Trade 
and Commercial Relations Agreement (PATCRA), SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) 
and South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA).  The number of 
RTA member countries is counted by including other individual countries that have formed trade 
agreements with each RTA. For example, the number of EC countries is 41, not 15, because we have 
included countries such as Malta, Cyprus and so on that formed free trade agreements with EC. The 
standard deviation is reported in parenthesis. Out of 17 RTAs, only CER and PATCRA are bilateral RTAs 
for which the standard deviation is not reported. 
 38 
Table 7: RTA Member Characteristics and the Effects on Trade Creation 
 
 (1) 
Distance 
(2) 
Border 
(3) 
Language
(4) 
All Three
GDP in pair 0.403** 
(0.018) 
0.403** 
(0.018) 
0.394** 
(0.018) 
0.393** 
(0.018) 
Per capita GDP in pair 0.273** 
(0.017) 
0.273** 
(0.017) 
0.283** 
(0.017) 
0.285** 
(0.017) 
Current colony  0.289** 
(0.087) 
0.289** 
(0.087) 
0.302** 
(0.087) 
0.288**
(0.087) 
(Currency union  0.651** 
(0.050) 
0.651** 
(0.050) 
0.654** 
(0.050) 
0.655** 
(0.050) 
RTA/Creation 2.678** 
(0.243) 
0.441** 
(0.087) 
0.338** 
(0.027) 
1.715** 
(0.285) 
RTA/CreatDist  -0.327** 
(0.035) 
  -0.201** 
(0.040) 
RTA/CreatBorder   0.629** 
(0.070) 
 0.431** 
(0.083) 
RTA/CreatLang   0.317** 
(0.054) 
0.154** 
(0.056) 
RTADiversion 0.061** 
(0.010) 
0.061** 
(0.010) 
0.061** 
(0.010) 
0.061** 
(0.010)) 
R-squared 0.52 0.52 0.51 0.52 
Note: All the estimations are based on panel regressions with fixed effects. RTA/CreatDist is an 
interaction term between RTA/Creation and a common land border dummy. Other variables starting with 
RTAs/Creat are similarly defined.  For the others, see also the note in Table 5. 
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Table 8: RTA Member Characteristics and the Effects on Trade Diversion 
  
 (1) 
Distance  
(2) 
Border 
(3) 
Language
(4) 
All Three
GDP in pair 0.397** 
(0.018) 
0.360** 
(0.018)
0.419** 
(0.018)
0.384** 
(0.018)
Per capita GDP in pair 0.280** 
(0.017) 
0.315** 
(0.017) 
0.253** 
(0.017) 
0.286** 
(0.017) 
Current colony  0.289** 
(0.087) 
0.274** 
(0.087) 
0.306** 
(0.087) 
0.264** 
(0.087) 
Currency union  0.652** 
(0.050) 
0.652** 
(0.049) 
0.662** 
(0.050) 
0.672** 
(0.050) 
RTACreation 2.675** 
(0.243) 
0.339** 
(0.025) 
0.353** 
(0.027) 
1.716** 
(0.305) 
RTA/CreatDist  -0.326** 
(0.035)   
-0.196** 
(0.040) 
RTA/CreatBorder 
 0.695** (0.070)  
0.452** 
(0.082) 
RTA/CreatLang 
  0.294** (0.054) 
0.105** 
(0.057) 
RTA/Diversion 0.258** 
(0.092) 
-0.017 
(0.012) 
0.140** 
(0.013) 
0.127 
(0.105) 
RTA/DiversDist -0.029* 
(0.014)   
-0.007 
(0.015) 
RTA/DiversBorder  
 0.321** (0.023)  
0.418** 
(0.026) 
RTA/DiversLang 
  -0.192** (0.019) 
-0.293** 
(0.021) 
R-squared 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.52 
Note: All the estimations are based on panel regressions with fixed effects.  RTAs/DiversDist is an 
interaction term between the average distance with other RTA members and RTA/Diversion. Other 
variables starting with RTAs/Divers are similarly defined.  For the others, see also the note in Table 5. 
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Table 9: The Characteristics and Trade Creation and Diversion Effects of East 
Asian RTAs 
 
Member Country Characteristics 
(Average of all member pairs) 
Trade Creation 
Effects (Average ) 
by considering 
Trade Diversion 
Effect (Average) 
by considering 
 
RTAs  
in 
East Asia 
(1) 
Average 
Distance 
(2) 
 
Border 
(3) 
Common 
Language 
(4) 
Average 
Distance
(5) 
All three  
Charact.
(6) 
Average 
Distance
(7) 
All three 
Charact. 
AFTA 6.816 0.265 0.088 0.453 0.509 0.061  0.164  
China-
Korea 7.139 0 0 0.348 0.317 0.051  0.077  
Japan-
Korea 6.374 0 0 0.597 0.462 0.073  0.082  
China-
Japan-
Korea 7.011 0 0 0.389 0.342 0.055  0.078  
AFTA-
China 6.941 0.279 0.093 0.412 0.491 0.057 0.168 
AFTA-
China-
Korea-
Japan 7.182 0.188 0.109 0.334 0.405 0.050 0.123 
Reference: 
All existing 
RTAs 6.760 0.113 0.328 0.471 0.477 0.062  0.031 
 
Notes:  The estimate of trade creation in Column 4 in Table 9 is constructed by 
combining the estimated coefficient on /RTA Creation  with the product of the 
estimated coefficient on /RTA CreatDist  of the gravity equation in column 1 of Table 8 
and the average distance of individual East Asian RTAs. The positive estimate indicates 
an increase of trade between members on average in unit of log of bilateral trade. The 
estimate of trade creation in Column 5 in Table 9 is constructed by considering the 
estimated coefficients of the gravity equation in column 4 of Table 8 and the averages of 
the three characteristics of individual East Asian RTAs. The estimates of trade diversion 
in Columns 6 and 7 in Table 9 are constructed similarly based on the estimated 
coefficients on diversion terms of the gravity equation in Table 8. The positive estimate 
indicates an increase of trade between member and non-member on average in unit of 
log of bilateral trade. 
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